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of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF · 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is 1an action by the Third Party Plaintiff 
against the Third Party Defendant, Insurance Com-
pany, to create a new and entirely different insur-
ance policy than the one for which the Third Party 
Plaintiff paid a premium. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court entered judgment in favor of 
the Third Pm·ty Defendant and against the Third 
Party Plaintiff. In particular the trial court found 
that by the terms of the insurance policy, insurance 
coverage was not found to exist when the vehicle in 
question was being operated by a person other than 
1 
Rosalie Joyner under the age of twenty-five years. 
And second, the tri1a1l court found the Third 
Party Defendant. did not waive it's right to assert 
the defense of non-coverage and was not barred by 
the doctrine of estoppel to 1assert this defense. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent wants the judgment of the 
lower court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FA:CTS 
The appellant's Statement of Facts is not com-
plete, and it is 1also incorrect in some detail. Policy 
No. ACR 65992 issued by the United Pacific Insur-
ance Company to the Th'ird Party Plaintiff, in effect 
from November 18, 1961 to November 18, 1962 af-
fords coverage for Bodily Injury Liability, Cover-
age A; Property Damage Liability, Coverage B; 
Automobile Medical Payments, Coverage C; Compre-
hensive Coverage, Coverage E; and Collision Cover-
age, $100 deductible, Coverage F (R '21). No cover-
age was afforded under Coverage D for Fire and 
Theft, and no separate premium was paid for this 
item (R 21). Coverage E, 'the Comprehensive Cover-
age, is the coverage most favorable to the Third 
Party Plaintiff and Appellant. The respondent con-
cedes that except for Endorsement 1, coverage would 
have been afforded to the Third Party Plaintiff and 
Appellant under Coverage E. 
Endorsement No. 1 reads as follows: 
"'Driver Exclusion - It is agreed that no in-
surance is afforded the named insured, any 
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other in~ured, person, organization, firm or 
corporat10n by or under any provision of the 
policy or of any endorsement attached there-
to 01· iss1:1ed to form a part thereof while any 
automobile covered by the policy is being oper-
ated, maintained or used by or under the con-
trol of any driver under the age of twenty-
five (25), other than Rosalie Joyner." 
The appellant in his Brief, Page 4, concedes 
that at the time the loss in question occurred, the 
vehicle insured was being operated by one Jimmy 
Joyner, age 13 years. 
The respondent did not negotiate with the P. E. 
Ashton Company relative to the repair of the ap-
pellant's vehicle. Neal Kershner, the body shop fore-
man for the plaintiff, (Tr. 10) testified that in the 
latter part of 1962 he had a conversation with Mr. 
Joyner with respect to repairs of the 1958 Dodge 
Truck ('Tr. 10) . He said at tha:t time the truck 
was in their yard and tha:t relative to repairing it 
he talked to a Mr. Green. He knew at that time Mr. 
Green was an adjuster for the Independent Auto 
Damage Appraisers of Salt Lake City. Further, Mr. 
Kershner said (Tr. 19) that he never talked to Mr. 
Kind, the adjuster, until after the vehicle of the 
Third Party Plaintiff was repaired. Further, Mr. 
Kershner said at the time he repaired the car (Tr. 
19) that they did not talk to anyone but claims the 
estimate was alright and that he could proceed to 
l'epair the automobile of Mr. Joyner. And in par-
ticular, (Tr. 19) Mr. Kershner said that he under-
stood in talking to Mr. Green the estimate was okay 
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as far as the adj us tor was concerned; not the In-
surance Company. Mr. Kershner (R 25) testified 
that the first conversation with Mr. Kind relative 
to the repair of the vehicle was in June or July of 
the year following the repair of the vehicle or 1963. 
Mr. Kershner said that he had no conversation with 
Mr. Kind or anyone else authorizing him to go ahead 
with repairs on the vehicle, (Tr. 26). Further, al-
though it is not admitted that Mr. Bowen, the agent 
for Insur1aince Incorporated, had any authority to 
make adjustments, Mr. Kershner testified that Mr. 
Bowen did not tell him to repair the vehicle either. 
On cross-examination (Tr. 28) Mr. Kershner testi-
fied that he knew from his own custom and prac-
tice in· the insurance industry that insurance com-
panies don't authorize repairs of vehicles ('Tr. 28). 
Mr. Kershner, (R 29) testified that the authori:?!a-
tion to repair the vehicle had to come from the 
owner. 
Mr. Joyner, Third Party Plaintiff, (Tr. 40) 
admitted that wh'en Mr. Kind contacted him about 
the damage to the vehicle that Mr. Kind said the 
Insurance Company was definitely no't going to pay 
the claim (Tr. 40). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY HELD THE 
APPELLANT WAS NOT INSURED AGAINST THE 
LOSS. 
Endorsement No. 1 was attached to the policy 
at the time it was issued. Under Policy No. ACR 
65992, it was agreed no insurance was afforded to 
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the appellant, the named insured, any other insured, 
person, organization, firm or corporation by or un-
der any provision of the policy, or endorsement at-
,atched thereto or issued to form a part thereof for 
any automobile covered by the policy was being 
operated, maintained or used by, or under the control 
of any driver under the age of twenty-five, other 
than Rosalie Joyner. 
There is no ambiguity in the insurance policy 
and respondent contends that to a person of ordinary 
intelligence and unders'taJnding, the wording of the 
endorsement was clear and certain and that in the 
usual and natural meaning, the endorsement e~­
cl uded all coverage to the named insured while 
Russell Joyner, a thirteen-year old, was operating 
the vehicle. 
It has long been the practice of the insurance in-
dustry for insurance companies to protect them-
selves against the carelessness and hazards involved 
of underaged drivers. 
In 7 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, 
Sec. 440-1, it is stated: 
"A provision 'that the ~ns~rer. shall .not be 
liable when the automobile is bemg driven by 
a person under the sp~ified age is v'.llid and 
binding upon the parties~ and operat10n by a 
person below. ~~at age . is not covered. The 
le()"al responsibility of his parents would not ch~ange the rule. Nor would the result depend 
on the qiwstion of whether or not the owner 
knowin_qly permitted such a person to oper-
ate." (Emphasis added.) 
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In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company vs. Coughran ( 19'27) 303 U.S. 485, 82 
L. E'd. 970, the Supreme Court of the United States 
declared where the policy excluded coverage from 
the vehicle that was being operated by a driver 
undera1ge, and where at the time of the accident a 
thirteen-year-old was operating a car, that a provi-
sion excluding coverage was enforceable, and re-
versed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and di-
rected a judgment be entered in favor of the Insur-
ance Company of "No Cause of Action." 
In Mitzner vs. Fidelity & Casi1;alty Company 
(1927) 154 N.E. 881, 94 Ind. App. 362, where the 
policy excluded coverage where a vehicle was oper-
ated by one under the age of sixteen, and where ad-
mittedly the driver in the case was under the age 
of sixteen, the court said in holding in favor of the 
Insurance Company: 
"There is no doubt or ambiguity about the 
above clause; it is not open to construction; 
it is a part of the coverage of said policy, and 
as said automobile was, at the time of said 
accident, being driven by a person under the 
age of sixteen years, said policy did not af-
ford such operation of said automobile; it 
was without the coverage of said policy; and 
there was no duty upon the insurance com-
pany to defend said damage suit nor is there 
any liability for the expenses thereof." 
In Hossley vs. Union Indemnity Company of 
New York, (1925) 102 So. 561, 137 Miss. 537, where 
the policy provided that it should not cover an auto-
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mobile driven by a person in violation of law as to 
age, or if there was no age limit, by a person under 
sixteen years, the court held the insurer w:as not 
liable for injuries resulting proximately by the auto-
mobile being driven by a person under sixteen years 
of age regardless of whether or not the owner agreed 
for such person to drive the car. 
In Helm vs. Inter-Insurance Exchange (1945) 
354 Mo. 935, 192 S.W. 2d 417, 167 A.L.R. 238, 
where the driver was fifteen years old at the time 
of the accident and where the policy excluded cover-
age if a driver was under the age of sixteen, the 
coutt held there was no liability and no coverage 
was afforded under the terms of the policy. 
In 6 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law 
& Practice, Section 3949, Blashfield states that ex-
press exemptions or exclusions from liability arising 
where the automobile was being opel'!ated by a per-
son in violation as to the age of the driver are not 
repugnant to the statute provisions and are not void 
as against public policy. 
United Pacific Insurance Company knows of no 
statute or ease in this state ruling such an exclusion 
to be invalid or void as against public policy. 
In case of dou:bt or ambiguity, it is correct to 
construe the insurance policy in favor of the in-
sured and against the insuror. In this case, however, 
we have no ambiguity or doubt as to the meaning 
of Endorsement No. 1. The Insurance Company is 
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entitled to have the terms of their policy interpreted 
in their ordinary and popular sense. 
In State Farm Jlifutu.al Autom<'bile Insurance 
Company vs. Shaffer (1959) 250 N.C. 45 108 S.E. 
2d 49, the general rule as to interpretation with re-
gard to a problem of this type was stated: 
"The interpretation of provisions of a liability 
policy in light of facts found is a ma;tter of law 
for the court, and in construing the policy, it 
unambiguous terms are to be taken in their 
plain, ordinary and popular sense." 
In Utah, in Auto Lease Company vs. Central 
Muti~al Insurance Company (1958) 7 U. 2d 336, 
325 P. 2d 264, our court said that the rule that in 
case of uncertainty or ambiguity of the insurance 
policy should be construed most strongly against 
insuror because it drew 1and issued the policy, but 
unless there is some genuine ambiguity or uncer-
tainty in the language upon which reasonable minds 
may differ as to the meaning, and that the require-
ment was not satisfied merely because a party may 
get a different meaning by placing a forced or 
strained construction, and that the test to be applied 
was: 
"That the meaning be plain to a person of 
ordinary intelligence and understandin~, 
viewing the matter fairly and reasonably, m 
accordance with the usual and natural mean-
ing of the words, and in light of existing cir-
cumstances, including the purpose of ~he 
policy. If so, the special rule of construct10n 
is obviously unnecessary." 
United Pacific Insurance Company submits that 
under Endorsement No. 1 excluding coverage to the 
named insured, the appellant, there is no coverage 
afforded for the vehicle in question when being oper-
ated by Jimmy Joyner, age thirteen, and the en-
dorsement excluded coverage to Mr. Joyner if the 
vehicle was being operated by someone under the 
age of twenty-five other than Rosalie Joyner. The 
meaning of the policy is clear ,and certain and not 
ambiguous. 
Since the Insurance Company knew that Jimmy 
Joyner had been operating the vehicle since he was 
eleven years of age at the time the endorsement ( 1) 
was attached to the pollcy, it is difficult if not im-
possible to believe the father, the appellrant, did not 
know as much. However, it is submitted in view of 
the wording of Endorsement No. 1 that it was not 
material as to whether or not the father admittedly 
knew of the operation of the vehicle by Jimmy 
Joyner. 
The pertinent question is whether or not Jim-
my Joyner was under the age of twenty-five, and 
this is admitted. 
The purpose of exclusionary endorsement is 
to prohibit insureds from permitting inexperienced 
operators to use the vehicle. The owner has control 
over the use of the car. Either by proper training 
of his family or by proper locking of the car and 
retention and custody of the keys, use can be re-
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stricted. Only the owner can restrict the use not 
' the Insurance Company. 
The only case the appellant cites which even 
remotely support appellant's contention, is the case 
of Aetna Casualty and Surety Company VS. Habib 
Etoch, 17 4 Ark. 409, 295 S.W. 2d 376. This is a 
case tha:t holds that where the driver of vehicle left 
it in charge of an eleven year old boy while he was 
in a barber shop, the vehicle nevertheless was in the 
control of the person in the barber shop and not in 
control of the eleven year old boy who endeavored 
to operate it. 
Applying this 1analogy to our particular case, 
we would have to find that at the time of the loss, 
Mr. Joyner was in control of the vehicle when in 
fact, he did not know about the loss until some days 
later and was, in fact, on a plane to Washington 
D.C. some hundreds of miles from the scene of the 
accident. In the Aetna Casualty & Surety Company 
vs. Habib Etoch case, supra, the court went a long 
way to hold the Insurance Company liable. In this 
case, the appellant wan ts the court to go a good many 
miles further in an effort to reach the deep pocket 
of the Insurance Company. 
POINT II 
THE COURT CORRECTLY FOUND NO ACCORD 
BETWEEN THE APPELLANT AND THE RESPON-
DENT. 
An Accord and Satisfaction is an agreement 
between two parties to give and accept something 
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in satisfaction of a right of action which one has 
against the other, which when performed, is 'a bar 
to all actions upon the account. To be effective an 
' accord must be complete. 
The record shows that P. E. Ashton Company, 
acting through it's Body Shop Foreman, started in on 
the repairs of the truck at the direction of the appel-
lant, and not the respondent, and that Mr. Keshner 
knew it was not the policy nor practice of the In-
surance Company to authorize repairs on vehicles 
damaged. Further, it would appear that if there is 
still a dispute in existence as to whether or rrot the 
appellant was making his claim under the compre-
hensive or collision coverage, no accord or agree-
ment was reached, and in any event, the appellant 
admits he did not accept the offer of the respondent, 
because he wanted to make a larger claim under the 
comprehensive coverage and that the respondent 
merely offered to pay appellant under the collision 
coverage. 
As a practical matter, the adjuster, Mr. Kind, 
forgot a!bout the exclusionary endorsement, exclud-
ing all coverage to Mr. Joyner when the vehicle was 
being operated by a person under the age of twenty-
five other than Rosalie Joyner and mistakenly mail-
ed out a Collision Release. The mistake caused no 
damage and was discovered before any payment 
was made. 
Although in this appeal and at the various 
hearings (R 46) the appellant argues that by hav-
11 
ing made the off er to pay under the collision cover-
age, the respondent waived it's defense of non-cover-
age; that an accord was reached; and that it was 
stopped from denying liability on this basis. How-
ever, the trial court, in accordance with Keck vs. 
American Fire Insurance Company (1942) 237 Mo. 
App. 308, 167 S.W. 2d 644, held that a waiver does 
not create a new cause of aetion where none is ex-
istent, and that ordinarily a waiver is applied for 
the purpose of def eating a forfeiture, and even if a 
substantial right is claimed as a waiver, there must 
be some consideration for it. Further, with respect 
to an estoppel, an estoppel does not create a new 
cause of action, but merely protects the rights pre-
viously acquired, and further an estoppel does not 
apply to work a gain to a party, but only to protect 
from loss. An estoppel does not operate unless a 
party has been induced to act to his injury. 
The respondent submits the appellant cannot 
recover under the Doctrine of Accord and Satis-
faction because: 
( 1) The Release tendered was in the amount 
of $913.49 under the collision coverage (Exhibit 
D-7), 
( 2) The Release tendered was nevel' accepted 
by the Third Party Plaintiff and Appellant, 
( 3) The testimony of the Third Party Plain-
tiff and Appellant shows he never had any inten-
tion of accepting the Release tendered, 
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( 4) The Release was withdrawn before an ac-
ceptance was made. 
It is obvious from the evidence the lower court 
was not compelled in any respect to find an Accord 
and Satisfaction, and that further the evidence 
would not have supported such a finding. 
In Dillman vs. Massey Ferguson, Inc. ('196'2) 13 
U. 2d 142, 369 P. 2d 296, where there was a dispute 
as to whether the manufacturer breached it's con-
tract by refusing to buy back items, and where 
plaintiff accepted and cashed the manufacturer's 
check after protesting the check did not take care 
of all that was due plaintiff, the court affirmed 
a judgment holding acceptance of the check was not 
an Accord and Satisfaction. 
In ,Riclvards and Sorenson vs. Lake Hills (1964) 
15 U. 2d 150, 289 P. 2d 66, where trial court found 
defendant offered plaintiff a non-interest bearing 
debenture in the sum of $10,000.00 and where plain-
tiff returned it with a letter rejecting it, the ·court 
sustained the trial court's finding tha:t no accord 
was reached. 
If acceptance of a check does not con~titµ,,t~ 
an accord, it would appear that for better reason, the 
non-acceptance of a Release would also not consti-
tute 1an accord. ···-~- · · ;:_ ._, · 
No coverage was afforded Mr. Joyner because 
of Endorsement No. 1 excluded coverage for ve-




effect of Mr. Joyner's claim is to ask for a new 
cause of action to be created where none existed 
' 
and further he wants a new cause of action created 
where he gave no consideration for it. 
As he had no right to make a claim when the 
vehicle was being operated by someone under twenty-
five other than Rosalie, he is asking for a gain by 
way of estoppel and not for protection against a 
'loss. This, of course, is not an estoppel anymore 
than an accord, and as the evidence shows, Mr. 
Joyner was not induced to repair the vehicle by 
Mr. Kind, even if you assume repairing his own 
vehicle is an injury, no estoppel existed. And, of 
course, Mr. Joyner was benefited by Mr. Kershner's 
repairs to the vehicle and not damaged. On the ques-
tion of accord, the lower court found the evidence 
in favor of the respondent and against the appellant, 
and the evidence in that respect should be weighed 
in the light most favorable to the respondent. 
The only issue for the court to decide, in the 
opinion of the respondent, is: 
Was Endorsement No. 1 an effective bar to 
the appellant's right to recover? 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectively submitted Endorsement No. 
1 excluded all coverage to the appellant under any 
coverage, and bars respondent from any liability to 
the plaintiff in this action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAYMOND M. BERRY 
Attorney for Third Party 
Defendant and Respondent 
1473South11th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
I hereby certify that on this ---------------- day of 
____________________________ , 1965, I mailed two copies of this 
Brief by United States mail, postage prepaid, to 
Jackson B. Howiard for Howard & Lewis, Attorneys 
for the Appellant, 120 East 3rd North, Provo, Utah. 
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